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ARTICLE
CANING AND THE CONSTITUTION: WHY THE
BACKLASH AGAINST CRIME WON'T RESULT IN THE
BACK-LASHING OF CRIMINALS
Michael P. Matthews*
Ever since Michael Fay' was sentenced to six lashes with a cane
in a Singapore prison in 1994, state legislators across America have been
clamoring to legalize the same punishment here for petty criminals and
juvenile offenders.' Although legislative attempts to introduce caning
"Law Clerk to Chief Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Wisconsin. BA., magna cum laude, Georgetown University (1993); J.D., magna
cum laude, University of Michigan Law School (1996); member of the Wisconsin Bar. The
assistance of Attorneys Bryan Stevenson and Ruth Friedman of the Equal Justice Initiative of
Alabama and Professor Samuel Gross of the University of Michigan Law School is gratefully
acknowledged. I am also indebted to my wife Jill and to my parents for their support.
'Michael Fay, an 18 year-old American, was lashed four times with a rattan cane in
Singapore in 1994 for vandalizing cars. Larry Copeland, Movement For Caning in U.S.
Beginning To Be Taken Seriously, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1995, at A20. "President Clinton
appealed repeatedly to Singapore for clemency, and got the number of strokes reduced to four."
Id.
'See infra Part I and accompanying text.
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have been defeated in several states in the last two to three years, efforts
to authorize it continue across the country.' This article describes the
caning phenomenon and explains why caning violates both the U.S.
Constitution and international law. Part I describes caning and the recent
legislative efforts to legalize it as a criminal punishment. Part II briefly
considers some possible reasons for the revival of corporal punishment in
America and focuses particularly on race-related reasons. Part III explains
how caning violates the Eighth Amendment and possibly various other
constitutional provisions as well. Part IV demonstrates how caning
violates international law. The conclusion forecasts the likely fate of
caning in America.
I. THE DEFINITION OF CANING AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE IT
Theodore Simon, founder of International Legal Defense Counsel
and the defense lawyer for Michael Fay, says that the definition of caning
is virtually the same everywhere, whether it comes from an Amnesty
International member or a Singaporean prison official. As quoted in the
Legal Intelligencer on March 24, 1994, Simon cited a definition of caning
from a Malayan Law Journal:
Caners are all robustly built and hold quite high grades in
the martial arts. They wield a half-inch thick, four-foot-
long rattan cane that the night before is thoroughly soaked
in water so that it will not break upon making contact with
the victim. The caner then takes a measured distance
from the victim, who at this point is bent over a trestle
and tied down with his buttocks exposed. From this
measured distance he wields with all the force of his body
weight and strikes the rear butt with the cane. Upon
contact it results in the splitting of the skin, a flaying of the
skin where the bare butt ends up entirely bloodied. The
3See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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individuals, in addition to screaming, will normally urinate
[on] themselves, faint and go into shock. The individuals
require hospitalization and it results in permanent physical
scarring.'
This definition is consistent with the caning Fay suffered in Singapore: "I
felt a deep burning sensation throughout my body, real pain. The flesh
was ripped open."4  Nineteenth-century accounts of those who
administered beatings with rattan canes described similar effects: "I have
found my clothes all over blood from the knees to the crown of my head,
and have looked as though I had just emerged from the slaughter-house.
. I have picked and washed off my clothes pieces of skin and flesh that
had been cut from the poor sufferer's back."5
Although some have assumed that caning in the United States
would take a milder form,6 many proponents of caning, especially in the
Hank GrezIak, Phila Lawyer Fights to Prevent 'Caning': Charges in Singapore,
U.S. Citizen faces Brutal Punishment, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 1994, at 1.
4 Melinda Liu, 7 Tried to Ignore the Pain, " NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1994, at 36.
1JoHN SHipP, FLOGGING AND ITS SUBSTITUTE 20 (1831).
The only comprehensive constitutional analysis, of caning done thus far, which
concluded that caning in general does not violate the Eighth Amendment, assumed without
discussion that "Singapore-style" caning would violate the Eighth Amendment:
Similarly, canings, such as those administered to Michael Fay, would not
meet Eighth Amendment standards because they often draw blood and
cause offenders to lose consciousness. By contrast, a well-monitored
whipping that is not intended to break the skin, to leave permanent marks,
or to be reasonably expected to cause severe physical or emotional injury
should survive constitutional attack.
Daniel E. Hall, When CaningMeets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders in the United
States, 4 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 403, 437-38 (1995). Professor Hall really only judged the
constitutionality of paddling or some less-violent alternative to flogging, not caning as it is
commonly understood. As I discuss later, simple paddling may pass constitutional muster. See
infra Part Ilid. [Despite my agreement with Professor Hall regarding paddling, I disagree with
his Eighth Amendment analysis. See infra notes 59 and 67.]
Therefore, this article's analysis of caning does not apply to various bills proposing the
authorization of paddling, for example, in New Hampshire (Laurette Ziemer, Graffiti Vandals
Face Shame of Public Flogging, EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 5, 1996, at 3), St. Louis (Thom
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Old South, specifically advocate the legalization of "Singapore-style"
caning. The supporters of a bill proposed in Alabama last year expressly
called for canings like those described above. Alabama Prison
Commissioner Ron Jones, a penal professional who expressed support for
the bill, said that "he favored the hiring of a martial arts expert 'who
knows what he's doing when the licks are given."'" The sponsor of the bill,
Senator Charles Davidson of Jasper, Alabama, added that "the state 'may
have to import some Chinese to show us how to do it."'" Davidson
described the caning instrument as "a bamboo cane split ... The night
before you soak it limber. The edges on which it has been split are sharp
as a razor... to draw blood. ' State legislators in Tennessee have also
specifically proposed Singapore-style canings that involve "breaking a little
skin and seeing a little blood."'" The Tennessee legislators sought to
authorize public caning "on the courthouse steps in the County in which
the criminal act was committed."1'
A number of other state legislatures have recently considered
Gross, Campaign Under Way to Adopt Paddling, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 1994,
at 3B), Cincinnati, California (Kendall Anderson, Backers of Paddling Want Teen Offenders
to Feel the Pain, DALLAs MORMNG NEws, June 6, 1994, at IA), and New York (Michael
Slackman, State Anti-Graffiti Bill Won't Spare the Paddle, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1997, at A2 1).
Some of these bills have since been defeated or have lost momentum, see, e.g., Eric Bailey,
Bipartisan Bloc Whips Effort to Require Paddling of Graffiti Vandals, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 2,
1996, at 16; however, others are reintroduced on a regular basis. See Slackman, supra at A21.
These bills propose paddling that is specifically intended to embarrass, not to lacerate and
permanently scar. See, e.g., Eric Adler, Back with a Vengeance: Old World Retribution: "An
Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth" Gains Favor AmongAmericans Who Want Criminals
Stopped Dead in Their Tracks, FORT LADERDALE SuN-SENTINEL, May 26, 1996, at 8 (quoting
sponsor of New Hampshire bill: "rm not talking about caning them Singapore-style,... This is
more of a public shaming device to teach kids there are consequences to their actions.").
' Editorial, Going Too Far; Proposed Caning Bill Outrageous, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Oct. 12, 1995, at 14A.
gId.
9Bill Poovey, Jones Supports 'Caning' Youths, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 14,
1995, at 3B.
10 Rebecca Ferrar, State Legislators Seek Caning as Punishment for Vandals,
Burglars, KNOXVILLE NEws-SENTNEL, Feb. 3, 1995, at A3.
" S.B. 380 See. 3(d) (Tenn. 1995).
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introducing caning as a punishment. For example, Maryland has
considered a similar bill allowing the caning of minors,12 as has
Mississippi.'3 Other Southern officials have called publicly for caning
without proposing specific legislation' 4 Public support for caning appears
strong -- 59% of Americans polled either support caning for drug dealers
or think that caning them would be going "too easy" on them.'5 As of this
writing, no state legislature has passed a statute authorizing caning.
II. WHY IS CORPORAL PUNISHMENT BECOMING POPULAR AGAIN?
After several hundred years of declining support for flogging 6 in
America, it was virtually extinct by the mid-twentieth century, having been
banned in every state except Delaware (which finally banned it in 1972,
but had not whipped anyone since 1952). ' Although whipping had been
a standard punishment in America from colonial times, the frequency of
12 H.B. 1077 (Md. 1995).
13 H.B. 904 (Miss. 1996) would authorize voluntary submission to whipping in
exchange for getting out of prison, and H.B. 381 (Miss. 1997) would authorize caning as a
punishment for church-burning.
14 See, e.g., Southeast Journal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1997 ("Mecklenburg County,
N.C., Commissioner Joel Carter recommends caning misdemeanor offenders and suggests that
Charlotte turn itself into 'the caning capital of the South."').
"Poll Update, NEwswEEK, Apr. 12, 1994. But see Ronald Brownstein, Singapore's
Caning Sentence Divides Americans, PollFinds, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1994, at A20
(finding that 60% ofnAmericans oppose caning in the United States).
16Flogging is basically the same as caning - Webster's defines it as "to beat or strike
hard and repeatedly with a cane." NEw WEBSTER!S DICTIONARY & THESAURUS OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 361 (1992). Also, whipping with a leather strap is similar to inflicting punishment
with a rattan cane, as both have the same effect upon the recipient of the blows. In Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), the petitioners, inmates who had been whipped by prison
guards, "received lashes on the bare buttocks .... There is corroborating and other evidence.
.. of deep bruises and bleeding," id. at 575, just as convicts would receive blows with a cane that
would "draw blood" under the proposed Alabama caning law. Poovey, supra note 9, at 3B.
Therefore, "caning", "whipping", and "flogging" will be used interchangeably throughout this
article and will be considered to be synonymous for analytical purposes (although distinguishable
from paddling, see supra note 6).
7Tom Troy, Castle Opposes Wipping Post, U.P.I., Feb. 7, 1989.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
its application began to decline in the early to mid-1800's with the
spreading influence of Utilitarian theories of punishment," which fueled
the American prison reform movement. 9 The campaign against flogging
in prisons grew to encompass all forms of brutal corporal punishment, and
before long, the whipping of soldiers, juvenile offenders, and students was
prohibited or was severely curtailed.2" Today, the only state-sanctioned
corporal punishment in our society exists in the nation's schools (twenty-
three states permit corporal punishment in schools).2 '
The recent movement to authorize caning cannot be blamed
wholly on the Fay episode, though undoubtedly that event triggered the
sudden flood of proposed legislation. The proponents of these bills have
offered a number of other justifications for them. The original motivation
behind the Alabama caning bill, for example, was purportedly financial:
"[t]he caning issue surfaced in the budget hearing as Dr. [Ron] Jones told
lawmakers the department [would] need an additional $5 million in its
General Fund appropriation for fiscal 1997. He said an increasing number
of 15- 16- and 17-year-old offenders [were] being sentenced to adult
prisons."22 Because the caning of juveniles would be "in lieu of going to
prison," it "would be an alternative to taxpayers paying the cost of
incarcerating an increasing number of young offenders."23 Interestingly,
prison overcrowding is the same reason why whipping enjoyed a brief
upswing in popularity in the mid- 1800's -- between 1843 and 1847, Sing
' These theories, popularized by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, sought to
expand the purposes of punishment from simple, vicious retribution, to encompass the aims of
specific and general deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Therefore, reformers
advocated the substitution of imprisonment and treatment of offenders for brutal corporal
punishments. HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 101 (2d ed. 1972).
19 MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1984).
20Id. at 146.
21 See Public Likes Proposed Public-Beating Laws, Experts Do Not, CHARLESTON
GAzETTE &DAILY MAIL, Mar. 12, 1995, at 5A, but see Beth Ashley, Spanking on the Decline
in Public Schools, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1996, at 8D (noting that the U.S. Department of
Education recorded 1,415,540 instances of corporal punishment in schools in 1982, but only
555,531 in 1992).
22 Poovey, supra note 9, at 3B.
23 Id.
576 [Vol. XIV
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Sing Prison in New York administered nearly 2500 lashes to convicts.24
Also, Senator Davidson of Alabama has claimed that the caning
ofjuveniles would serve as an effective deterrent to later misconduct: "If
we do a little caning early on in life and get their attention, I don't think we
will have to deal with them later in life."25 Dr. Jones echoed those
sentiments: "I think at that age, caning would work real well."26
Another conceivable reason for the caning initiative that is not
likely to be trumpeted by its supporters is the hysteria over crime that is
now the driving force behind most criminal reform proposals in America,
a hysteria that is often fueled by popular images of violent black criminals.
This hysteria reaches extremes in the Old South, where all of the
"Singapore-style" caning bills introduced in the United States have
germinated. For example, in Alabama, espousing severe punishments that
border on the absurd is de rigueur.21
The hysteria over crime is by no means restricted to Alabama,
though some have traced its genesis to one of Alabama's most famous
citizens:
At least since the George Wallace campaign of 1968, fear
of crime (and the racism that often fuels it) has been at the
heart of the right-wing revolution. Conservative candidates
of both parties have prospered by whipping up fear of a
rising tide of lawbreaking and threats to individual safety,
24 GLENN, supra note 19, at 10.
' Editorial, Sanctioning Cruelty; Caning Proposal Sheer Stupidity, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1995, at 5.6 Id. However, Jones has expressed doubt about the deterrent effect on adult
prisoners: "I don't think it would work well on the adult offender." Rhonda Cook, Around the
South: Back to Hard Labor, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 20, 1995, at 4D.
'See, e.g., Soapbox, Deserves Chair, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr. 3, 1996, at
17A ("I believe whoever stole my Jimmy Buffett CDs deserves the electric chair."); Q & A,
ENTERPRISE LEDGER (Enterprise, Ala.), June 9, 1995, at 11. ("Q: How long do you think
prisoners convicted of capital crimes should be allowed to stay in prison on appeal before being
executed? A: Art Audette: I say kill 'em immediately or at least within 48 hours.").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIV
despite twenty years of declining victimization rates.28
In Alabama, this tradition takes the form of citing falsely inflated crime
statistics, for example: "8 in every 10 Alabamians will be a victim of
violent crime at least once in their lifetime... the average career criminal,
once out of jail, is committing about three crimes per week."29 The first
statistic is simply wrong -- even assuming that no person is a victim twice,
the rate is not even half that high." The second statistic can be slanted
according to how "average career criminal" is defined, and is thus
meaningless.
Such sensationalistic propaganda is now commonplace, as
crimial defendants have become the most recent devils at which we as a
society can direct our hatred and condemnation:
For the right, crime is the communism of the post-cold
war era: the principal vehicle for exploiting fear of social
decay, not to mention inchoate racism and anti-urban
prejudice... [conservatives] offer a simple, reductionist
answer: authority of church, authority of prison and
authority of state, a powerful and dangerous formula.31
Some scholars have characterized this as an "'authoritarian trend' in the
United States, characterized by increasingly passionate calls for the death
penalty ... carrying concealed weapons ... [and] public paddling.
32
28 Bruce Shapiro, How the War on Crime Imprisons America, NATION, Apr. 22,
1996, at 20; see also Dan Goodgame, Why Bigotry Still Works at Election Time, TIME, Nov.
25, 1991, at 44 (tracing today's race-baiting crime rhetoric to the Wallace campaign).
29 Michael Sibley, Brown Says She's Tough on Crime, TROY MESSENGER (Alabama),
Feb. 14, 1996 (quoting Court of Criminal Appeals candidate Jean Brown).
30 ALABAMA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION CENTER, CRIME IN ALABAMA 24
(1994).
31 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 20.
32 Anderson, supra note 6, at IA (quoting Dr. William F. Stone, a political
psychologist at the University of Maine).
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"Authoritarian trends" appear to have the same characteristics regardless
of the era in which they arise -- the eighteenth-century abuses that led to
the criminal reforms described above seem to be reappearing today:
"secret accusations" [as authorized by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534, allowing
the use of secret evidence in deportation hearings], "almost complete
absence of provision for the defense of the accused" [as has occurred in
many states regarding death-row inmates, since the de-funding of capital
resource centers], "an incredibly large number of capital crimes" [provided
by, for example, the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994], "and barbarous
lesser punishments, such as whipping" [as could soon be legalized in a
number of states].33
Such authoritarian trends have often been connected with white
fears of black crime: "Across the South, white reaction [to black crime
after Emancipation] was intense. There were calls to bring back the
gallows for serious property crimes, and the whipping post for
misdemeanors such as vagrancy and petty theft. 34 This is because one of
the prerequisites for administering such draconian punishments involves
defining the condemned class in terms that allow the majority of society
to separate themselves from the group and look down on it with derision:
"Define people as sub-social and strongarm measures become more
palatable. 35 John Dilulio, the G.O.P.'s premier expert on crime, describes
America's urban black community as "deviant, delinquent, and criminal
adults surrounded by severely abused and neglected children, '36 and he
refers to today's young urban males as "'fatherless, Godless and jobless,'
a national 'wolf pack' of conditioned 'superpredators.0'37  This
demonization of a group is necessary to justify extreme solutions to
perceived crises:
In some periods, society needed to suppress a group, as
SBARNES, supra note 18, at 97.
DAviD OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARcHmAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF
JIM CROW JUSTICE 33 (1996).
3S Shapiro, supra note 28, at 17.
36 Id.
" Id. at 15.
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with blacks during Reconstruction. Society coined an
image to suit that purpose -- that of primitive, powerful,
larger-than-life blacks, terrifying and barely under control.
At other times, for example during slavery, society needed
reassurance that blacks were docile, cheerful, and content
with their lot."
Today, one image of African-Americans that society has chosen
is typified by the infamous Willie Horton ad, created by Republicans
backing President Bush in 1988, that depicted a black man who raped a
white woman while on prison furlough. In the 1990s, "the spirit of
Hortonism is thriving" in political campaign commercials, albeit with more
care taken to avoid overt racism. 9 This image of blacks, if reinforced
enough, allows society to impose severe criminal penalties on the
demonized class: "A group that is criminal, vicious, animal-like, with
designs on white people's lives and pocketbooks -- such a group would
need to be controlled."4 Therefore, caning, which is not a penalty that
anyone can see being justified as a punishment for themselves or for their
children, is acceptable, even necessary, to keep the animalistic "wolf pack
of superpredators" in line. Of course, once someone from outside the
demonized group receives the caning penalty, its brutality may no longer
be considered justifiable: "A few places might try it, and then you'll see
some upper-middle-class parent upset that their kid is going to get it...
'Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CoRNIELLL. REv. 1258, 1276
(1992).
" Howard Kurtz, In 1994 Political Ads, Crime Is the Weapon of Choice, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at Al; see also Goodgame, supra note 28, at 44 (according to a close
adviser of George Bush, "[some of us would like to get beyond this business of scaring people
and dividing them against blacks, but its hard to argue against a formula that's seen as
successful.").
40 Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears - On
the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. Rnv. 503, 514 (1994).
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It's different when people are confronted with the issue in reality."4'
Like chain gangs, whipping also "conjures up an image of
slavery"42 and is reminiscent of the time when any white could whip any
black slave for insubordination.43 This imagery may offer psychological
comfort to many poor Southern whites," "the only ethnic group in
America not permitted to have a history."45 Since the end of the Civil
War, poor Southern whites have been in conflict with blacks:
For the poor white farmer, . . . [e]mancipation had not
only crushed his passionate dreams of slaveholding; it had
also erased one of the two 'great distinctions' between
himself and the Negro. The farmer was white and free;
the Negro was black -- but also free. How best to
preserve the remaining distinction -- white supremacy --
would become an obsession in the post-Civil War South.46
Today, white supremacy in Alabama takes the form of devout worship of
Confederate ancestors -- for example, Montgomery's city motto is
"Montgomery: The Cradle of the Confederacy," Confederate Memorial
Day is a state holiday (instead of Memorial Day), millions of dollars are
spent to preserve Confederate relics like the First White House of the
Confederacy,47 and the Confederate battle flag is ubiquitous.4" The
41Anderson, supra, note 6, at IA (quoting University of South Carolina government
professor Dr. Betty Glad).
42 Tanya Hodges, Chain Gangs: An Interview with Dr. Jones, FREE PRESS
(MONTGOMERY), Apr., 1996, at 7.
43 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNIsHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 86(1993).
44 "Caning was how a master treated a slave; it expressed the presumption that the
social status of the victim was below the social status of the attacker." Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181,2183 (1996).
4
3 DENNIS COVINGTON, SALVATION ON SAND MOUNTAIN 3 (1995).
46 
OSHINSKY, supra note 34, at 14.
47 "In Alabama, they are promoting recognition of an all-but-forgotten Jefferson Davis
Hwy. They demand prominent restoration of memorials discreetly removed to cemeteries years
ago." Tom Teepen, Confederate Flag: South Keeps Raising Nostalgia for Bad Old Days,
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRiB., Jan. 12, 1997, at 16A.
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whipping and chaining of blacks fits in neatly with this longing for the
"good old days" of cotton plantations, antebellum mansions, and slavery.49
The popularity of the Confederate flag in the South dates not from the Civil War but
from the 1950s and 60s, when it was resurrected to protest racial desegregation:
In 1956, when the South was facing the integration of its public schools,
the Georgia legislature changed the state flag and inserted the Stars and
Bars - one emblem of the Confederacy. Given the timing, the revised flag
was not a harmless expression of regional pride. It was a political
statement, a way to tell black citizens what the white legislature thought of
them.
Ed Quillen, And soon, perhaps, those Confederate bonds will pay off, DENVER POST, July 9,
1996, at B7; see also Teepen, supra note 47, at Al 6 ("Alabama and South Carolina took to
flying Confederate flags over their statehouses in the '60s, ensigns of their defiance of the
Constitution."); Jonathan Yardley, Is S.C. 's Civil War Fervor Flagging?, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
1996, at C2 ("in South Carolina... resistance to desegregation was so adamant that in 1962 it
raised the Confederate battle flag over its Capitol").
49 Senator Davidson, the sponsor of the Alabama caning bill, is one of the world's few
remaining slavery apologists:
[Un a speech he prepared for a state Senate debate over his proposal to fly
the Confederate battle flag over the state Capitol.... [Davidson] reached
for Bible verses to justify slavery, not only as good for blacks but also as
God's will. He referred to Leviticus 25:44-You may acquire male and
female slaves from the pagan nations that are around you. He also quoted
I Timothy 6:1, where it says slaves should regard their masters as worthy
of all honor .... The incidence of abuse, rape, broken homes and murder
are 100 times greater, today, in the housing projects than they ever were on
the slave plantations of the Old South, Davidson wrote in his speech. The
truth is that nowhere on the face of the earth, in all of time, were servants
better treated or better loved than they were in the Old South by white,
black, Hispanic and Indian slave owners.
Clarence Page, Fables Not Worth Telling, CHI. TRiB., May 12, 1996, at 23.
On the other hand, the South's history of slavery may also work against the imposition
of caning because of concerns about resurrecting memories of the cruel and unjust punishment
of slaves: "For many, the mental picture of a caning in the courthouse square resonates too
closely with the cultural recollection of the runaway slave who was led, shackled, back to the
plantation and given 40 lashes as an example to others." Larry Copeland, Politicians Feed Cry
for Caning Lawbreakers: But Some Object to the Flurry of Proposals as an Echo of Whippings
of Slaves, ORANGE COuNTY REGISTER, Mar. 12, 1995, at Al; see also Editorial, Whipping,
Caning Can't Be the Best Solution to Crime, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar. 16, 1995, at
Al 5 ("It wouldn't do much for the sorry state of race relations in America to have a whipping
post set up in city hall courtyard, considering the relatively high proportion of African-American
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These are just a few of the possible reasons for widespread public
support for caning in Alabama and elsewhere in the Old South. The only
thing that is certain is that politicians propose severe corporal punishment
laws because "it plays really well politically."5 Senator Davidson of
Alabama has expressed his political motive for sponsoring the caning bill,
admitting that he doesn't "know if it'll stand up in court, but it should get
some dam good publicity.'' "I A number of political candidates have
proposed caning to bring attention to their candidacies.52
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST CANING
A. The Eighth Amendment Bar Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
1. Whipping Precedent
Before the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was
defendants, and our shameful history of slavery - when floggings were routine."); Editorial,
Singapore, USA?, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1995, at 1OA ("Mississippi's [caning] proposal... is
particularly painful to descendants of slaves.").
" Anderson, supra note 6, 1A (quoting Cincinnati City Council member Todd
Portune).
" Going Too Far, supra note 7, at 14A.
2See, e.g., John Iwasaki, Bergeson Maps OutAgenda After Outdistancing Taber,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6, 1996, at A15 (stating that State Superintendent of
Public Instruction Candidate Ron Taber advocated Singapore-style caning for drug dealers);
Florida: Dem Pollster Has Bush Up by Ten Points, THE HOTLINE (AMERIcAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, INC.), Oct. 11, 1994 (stating that Florida Governor candidate Jeb Bush supported
caning); Taylor: Takes His Me$ Ge East, THE HOTLNE (AMERICAN POLmCAL NETWORK, INC.),
Aug. 30, 1995 (stating that Presidential candidate Morry Taylor stood behind flogging);
Overlooked, THE HOTLINE (AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, INC.), June 24, 1994 (stating that
California U.S. House candidate supported caning of wife-beaters); House Briefings: May 3rd
Primaries, THE HOTLn (AMRIcAN POLITICAL NETWORK, INC.), Apr. 21, 1994 (stating that
Ohio U.S. House candidate supported caning).
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applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,53 courts
considered the legality of severe corporal punishments like whipping and
flogging under state law. 4 Most of these early decisions came out of
North Carolina,5" which initially condemned flogging; 6 however, these
decisions were overturned by State v. Revis,"7 which held that any
challenge to a statute authorizing flogging of prisoners "should be
addressed to the legislative branch of the government," as the statute was
"a valid exercise of the legislative power.""
The only modem-day court (in the last fifty years) to hold that the
practice of whipping convicts is not cruel and unusual, 9 the Supreme
53See State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); see also
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
m See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 108 F.Supp. 266,270 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (holding
that "whether whipping or corporal punishment is legal or illegal in a state is purely a matter of
state law"), rev'd on other grounds, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953).
" But see Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694 (Va. 1828) (finding whipping
"odious, but [not] unusual"); Westbrook v. State, 66 S.E. 788 (1909).
56 State v. Mincher, 90 S.E. 429 (N.C. 1916); State v. Morris, 81 S.E. 462 (N.C.
1914); State v. Nipper, 81 S.E. 164 (N.C. 1914).
17 136 S.E. 346 (N.C. 1927).
5S Id.
"' In 1965, the Eastern District of Arkansas refused to hold that all corporal
punishment is per se unconstitutional, but it did impose safeguards which it held were not
followed in that case:
[C]orporal punishment has not been viewed historically as a
constitutionally forbidden cruel and unusual punishment, and this Court is
not prepared to say that such punishment is per se unconstitutional....
But, the Court's unwillingness to say that the Constitution forbids the
imposition of any and all corporal punishment on convicts presupposes that
its infliction is surrounded by appropriate safeguards. It must not be
excessive; it must be inflicted as dispassionately as possible and by
responsible people; and it must be applied in reference to recognizable
standards whereby a convict may know what conduct on his part will cause
him to be whipped and how much punishment given conduct may
produce. The Court finds that those safeguards do not exist at the
Arkansas Penitentiary today, and until they are established the further
corporal punishment of petitioners must and will be enjoined.
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683,689 (E.D.Ark. 1965). Although the court did not hold that
corporal punishment is per se unconstitutional, it also did not hold that the whipping inflicted in
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Court of Delaware, also deferred to the state legislature on the question of
its constitutionality, holding that the state legislature's will could be the
only indicia of present-day morality (and thus the only factor examinable
in the constitutional analysis): "[t]he only manner in which such an
expression can be made is through the action of duly elected
representatives of the Society whose standard is to be applied."60
Other commentators have opined that this precedent means that
caning would be held to be constitutional today.6' However, the Cannon
holding has since been called into question by the Delaware Supreme
Court.62 After holding that the question of whether a sentence violated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Delaware Constitution was to
be left exclusively to the discretion of the legislature, as in Cannon, the
Ayers court said: "Since Robinson, however, the Eighth Amendment has
been made binding on the states, and the answer to the question must be
given in the light of the Eighth Amendment."'63 This suggests that the court
overruled the contention in Cannon that punishments authorized by the
state legislature are completely unreviewable. However, the Federal
that case was not cruel and unusual.
60 State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514,519 (Del. 1963); see also Balser v. State, 195 A.2d
757, 758 (Del. 1963) (reaffirming Cannon).
61 Professor Daniel Hall extensively discussed the Cannon case and concluded, based
on that precedent, that whipping is not unconstitutional:
Where does this leave whipping as the nation moves into the twenty-first
century? Contemporary caselaw demands a high regard for separation and
federalism principles. Deference to legislative determinations of
appropriate punishment should underlie judicial review. Unless grossly
disproportionate, a sentence of whipping should be left intact.
Hall, supra note 6, at 450; see also Hall, supra note 6, at 456 ("The decisions in Cannon and
Balser indicate that whipping is appropriate for [vandalism and theft] crimes."); Whitney S.
Wiedeman, Don't Spare the Rod: A Proposed Return to Public, Corporal Punishment of
Convicts, 23 Am. J. CRim. L. 651,657 (1996) ("Courts have failed to directly attack any possible
harm corporal punishment may cause. For example, Delaware used the lash to maintain
discipline in its prisons until the 1950s. The practice was discontinued and removed from the
list of available punishments twenty years later, but not because of any ruling by the Supreme
Court.") (citing Cannon).
62 State v. Ayers, 260 A.2d 162, 169 (Del. 1969).
63Id.
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District Court in Delaware later relied on Cannon as standing for the
proposition that courts may never review punishments authorized by the
state legislature.64 Since then, the Delaware Supreme Court has reiterated
its rejection of Cannon:
[I]f we are to adhere to Eighth Amendment principles in
interpreting Article I, Section 11, we must bring our own
judgment to bear upon the proportionality of Sanders'
sentence... if we automatically conclude that Sanders'
sentence is proportionate to his fault merely because the
General Assembly has ordained that death is an
acceptable punishment for a defendant such as Sanders,
the proportionality test becomes meaningless.6"
Therefore, the Cannon precedent is virtually obsolete in Delaware.
Even apart from the apparent death of this precedent, it can be
argued that the Cannon court misread the Supreme Court's findings
regarding whipping when it stated that "[t]he Supreme Court, however,
has not as yet held the punishment of whipping, in itself, cruel. It has
spoken of it as infamous, but that is possibly true of all punishment for
crime."'" The court seems to have overlooked or misinterpreted the
following passage:
The court in [Commonwealth v. Wyatt67] pronounced
[whipping] 'odious but not unusual.' Other cases have
seen something more than odiousness in it, and have
regarded it as one of the forbidden punishments. It is
certainly as odious as the pillory, and the latter has been
"Valley Forge Insurance Company v. Jefferson, 628 F.Supp. 502, 511 (D. Del.
1986).
65 Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 144-45 (Del. 1990).
6190 A2d at 518. The court is probably referring to Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,
427 (1885), in which the Supreme Court said, "at the present day either stocks or whipping
might be thought an infamous punishment."
67 6 Va. (1 Rand) 694 (1828).
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pronounced to be within the prohibitory clause.6"
This passage can be read as prohibiting whipping constitutionally, for the
chain of reasoning runs as follows: Since some courts have prohibited
whipping because it is "something more" than odious, and the pillory has
been constitutionally prohibited as "something more" than odious, then any
act which reaches that level of "something more" than odious must also be
constitutionally prohibited. Because the court finds that whipping reaches
that level of "something more" than odious by virtue of being equally as
odious as the pillory, it must be constitutionally prohibited.69
Those commentators who have opined that caning is constitutional
have also downplayed or overlooked important federal precedent holding
that whipping prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment."° In Jackson v.
Bishop,7 the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion written by then-Circuit Judge
Harry Blackmun, held that prison officials' use of a leather strap to whip
inmates violated the Eighth Amendment:
[W]e have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
use of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is
punishment which, in this last third of the 20th century,
" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377-78 (1910).
'However, this precedent is not determinative of a constitutional challenge to caning
because it is in dicta, and because it is so archaic - the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
is now vastly different from what it was in 1910.
70 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.). Mr.
Wiedeman completely overlooked this important precedent, stating that "no federal court has
ever found corporal punishment of criminals unconstitutional." Wiedeman, supra note 61, at
657-58. Professor Hall briefly described the Jackson case and noted that it "is often cited by
opponents of corporal punishment for the proposition that whipping is per se cruel and unusual."
Hall, supra note 6, at 445-46. He then extensively discussed the Cannon case and concluded
that a modem court would follow the Cannon precedent. Professor Hall did not discuss why
a court would not follow Jackson, nor did he discredit or attack the opinion. He merely noted
that the Jackson court's statement that it would not distinguish between a statutorily authorized
whipping and one imposed by corrections officials of their own accord was dictum. Id. at 446.
" 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment; that the strap's use,
irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be
imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and
human dignity and precepts of civilization which we
profess to possess.'
This holding has been cited with approval by the United States Supreme
Court73 and by several other federal circuit courts.74
Despite this compelling precedent, the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on the constitutionality of caning makes
reliance on this precedent alone unwise. Therefore, a full Eighth
Amendment analysis of caning must be undertaken to determine its
constitutionality.
2. Eighth Amendment Analysis
The Supreme Court has delineated four general approaches in
interpreting and applying the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.75 The first method, applied by Justice Scalia in
721 Id. at 579.
7' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Neither the
Congress nor any state legislature would today tolerate pillorying, branding, or cropping or
nailing of the ears - punishments that were in existence during our colonial era. Should,
however, any such punishment be prescribed, the courts would certainly enjoin its execution.")
(citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571).
74Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819,827 (5th Cir. 1971); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d
353,355 n.4 (7th Cir. 1974); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("The Jackson court engaged in the proper
constitutional analysis, for whatever the value of the strap to prison discipline might be... that
method of punishment [whipping] is out of place in late 20th Century American society, a
society that demands respect for human dignity.").
75 The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause.
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments protect all citizens,
including imprisoned convicts: "No government can, within the bounds of the Constitution,
cruelly punish a citizen whether he be in jail or at liberty." Adams v. Mathis, 458 F.Supp. 302,
19981 CANING AND THE CONSTITUTION 589
the majority opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky,76 involves asking whether
a punishment was considered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, and is described in Part "a" of this Section. The
second view consists of defining "evolving standards of decency" in
society by looking at objective indicia of contemporary public opinion,
mainly legislative enactments.' The applicability of this approach to
caning is described in Part "b" of this Section. The third inquiry, described
in Part "c", involves asking whether a punishment is "excessive," that is,
whether it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and
whether it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.78 The
fourth approach, expressed in Robinson v. California,79 involves
condemning any punishment at all for an action or status that is not
punishable constitutionally because a non-punitive measure would do as
well. ° Because that inquiry focuses on the offense, not the punishment,
it is inapplicable to assessing the constitutionality of caning in the abstract,
and will not be discussed further. Finally, because some recent caning
proposals focus on juvenile offenders, the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment to minors will be discussed in Part "d" of this Section. 1
308 (M.D. Ala. 1978). The Eighth Amendment may also protect some juveniles in detention
centers from cruel and unusual punishment. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575, 597
(SD.N.Y. 1972). See infra, Part M. d on the application of the Eighth Amendment to minors.
It applies to different types of punishment administered by the state: "Neither do we wish to draw
... any meaningful distinction between punishment by way of sentence statutorily prescribed
and punishment imposed for prison disciplinary purposes . . . the Eighth Amendment's
proscription has application to both." Jackson, 404 F.2d at 580-81.
"' 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy.
" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
78 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
79 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"Robinson, 370 U.S. 660, 661 (holding that criminally punishing the status of drug
addiction was unconstitutional because a civil commitment would have done as well).
" This section actually addresses whether or not the Eighth Amendment applies to any
citizens, not just juveniles, in domains that can be analogized to the school setting, because the
Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punishments meted out
in schools. Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977). However, the focus is on juveniles
because most bills proposed thus far authorize caning only for that group.
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a. Was the Punishment Considered Cruel and Unusual in 1791?
In his majority opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 2 Justice Scalia
began his Eighth Amendment analysis of the juvenile death penalty by
asking whether the punishment was "one of 'those modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the
Bill of Rights was adopted."'83 After concluding that it was not, Scalia
went on to assess the juvenile death penalty in light of the other modes of
analysis, such as the "evolving standards of decency" test. Although some
of Scalia's recent public comments suggest that he believes that this
"originalist" approach should be the only test under the Eighth
Amendment (a stance that could doom an Eighth Amendment challenge
to caning)," the fact that he went on to analyze the juvenile death penalty
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
83Id. at 368 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)).
4 Justice Scalia has publicly expressed conflicting opinions on the constitutionality of
caning. At first, he admitted that one of the central flaws in originalist methodology was that it
must sometimes be violated to avoid outrageous results, and he cited flogging as an example of
a punishment which originalist doctrine would mandate upholding, but which could not
practically be upheld by a modem court: "I am confident that public flogging ... would not be
sustained by our courts, and any espousal of originalism as a practical theory of exegesis must
somehow come to terms with that reality." Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989). Justice Scalia has dubbed this the problem of the "faint-hearted
originalist," and he has speculated that if he were to judge the constitutionality of flogging, he
may have to join that group: "I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove to be a faint-
hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding
a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging." Id. at 864. It was easy for Scalia to minimize
the import of that defect in originalist philosophy, for he assumed that such barbaric punishments
would never be proposed again: "But then I cannot imagine such a case's arising either ... I
expect I will rarely be confronted with making the stark choice.. ." Id. Now that caning and
flogging may become a reality in the United States, Scalia can no longer dismiss this flaw in his
judicial philosophy as insignificant. He has also come under heavy attack from the academic
world because of this defect in his methodology. See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe and Michael Dorf,
Levels ofGenerality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CI. L. REv. 1057, 1090 (1990) ("How
do we know when to reect an historical pattern or understanding?"); See also Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1187 (1993) ("Justice Scalia blinked"). For
whatever reasons, Justice Scalia appears to have fortified his "faint heart" at some point in the
last several years, because he has recently said publicly that he thinks caning is probably
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under the other modes of analysis shows his acceptance of them as valid
constitutional inquiries." This part of Justice Scalia's opinion reinforces
the Supreme Court's view that while a punishment is not necessarily
constitutional because it passes the originalist test, the punishment almost
certainly fails to pass constitutional muster if it cannot even clear this first
hurdle: "At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment
considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
The prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment are not limited, however, to
those practices condemned by the common law in 1789. 
s
t6
Therefore, one must initially determine if caning would have been
considered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. A number of courts have held that whipping was not cruel and
unusual in the minds of the Founding Fathers when the Eighth
Amendment was enacted: "the people who made this Constitution...
uniformly held that the punishment of whipping was not included in that
class which the Constitution forbids.... However, judicial opinion has
not been unanimous on this question: "The word 'cruel', when considered
in relation to the time when it found place in the bill of rights, meant...
constitutional: "Deriding the courfs modem view that the constitutional ban on cruel and
unusual punishment must be interpreted according to 'evolving standards of decency,' Scalia said
the ban should be understood in light of the punishments that were allowed in 1791, when the
Eighth Amendment was adopted." Justice Scalia Says Caning Likely Constitutional, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., May 7, 1994, at A18. It remains to be seen whether this comment was
merely an off-hand remark, or whether it signals a true reassessment by Scalia of his 'faint heart.'
However, it has already been used as ammunition by proponents of corporal punishment: "The
safety committee's analysis of the [California paddling] legislation found support for the law in
a recent speech by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia... Scalia surmised that a caning
. . . would not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment." Mark Walsh, Paddling Law Upfor Debate?, RECORDER, Aug. 10, 1994, at 3.
85 Scalia also acknowledged them by joining the opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989).
" Id. at 330 (joint opinion of O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, Ch. J., White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, JJ.) (citation omitted).
87 Foote v. State, 59 Maryland 264, 267-68 (1883); see also Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cases 447,450 (1824).
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such as that inflicted at the whipping post .... ,88 Despite some judicial
disagreement on this issue, the fact that whipping was included as a
punishment in the first Crimes Act of the United States 9 and in the first
Judiciary Act of the United States9° is convincing evidence that whipping
was not considered by the Founding Fathers to be cruel and unusual
punishment.
b. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test
This method of Eighth Amendment analysis, more well-developed
under Supreme Court jurisprudence than the originalist approach, involves
discovering what constitutes present-day societal mores: "The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."9 1 Courts have looked to a variety of
sources in making this determination.
i. Refer to the Legislatures
The predominant sources a court must look to under this analysis
are legislative enactments: "First among the 'objective indicia that reflect
the public attitude toward a given sanction' are statutes passed by society's
elected representatives."92 This analysis begins by counting how many
states allow a certain punishment and how many states do not allow it so
as to ascertain a "national consensus" on the issue.93 In Enmund v.
Florida,94 the Supreme Court struck down capital punishment for
' Miller v. State, 49 N.E. Rep. 894,897 (Ind. 1898); see also Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E.
Rep. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893) (restating language from Miller).
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9; 1 Stat. 112-119.
9°Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, See. 9; 1 Stat. 76.
91 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
92Stanford,492 U.S. at 370 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)
and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
'Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-29
(1988).
' 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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participation in a robbery where an accomplice caused a death that the
defendant did not intend, because only eight jurisdictions authorized that
punishment. In Stanford, the Court held that because less than half of the
states authorizing the death penalty prohibited it for 16- and 17-year-olds,
there was no national consensus against it, rendering the punishment
constitutional.' Since only a handful of states have even proposed caning
statutes, there might appear to be an overwhelming national consensus
against it, rendering it clearly unconstitutional. On the other hand, one
state always has to be the first to implement a new punishment, and being
the first does not necessarily mean that whatever punishment it implements
must be held to be unconstitutional.96 That is why other sources should
also be considered when determining what constitutes the "evolving
standards of decency" of society.
"Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-72.
9 In several Supreme Court opinions, the number of states needed to express a
"national consensus" against a punishment has neared complete unanimity. In Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Court held that even though only three states allowed a judge
to override ajury's recommendation of life, the override did not violate the Eighth Amendment:
"The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice, however, does not
establish that contemporary standards of decency are offended by the jury override. The Eighth
Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of
its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." Id. at 464. This position was taken to
its logical extreme by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995), in which
the majority upheld Alabama's standardless jury override system against Eighth Amendment
challenge despite the fact that it is the only state that has such a system. See 130 L. Ed. 2d at
1023 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Spaziano Court held that the rejection.., of capital jury
overrides by all but (at that time) three (states), did not demonstrate an 'evolving standard'
disfavoring overrides. (cite omitted) Surely, however, the rejection of standardless overrides by
every State in the Union but Alabama is a different matter"). However, the Court seems to
consider procedural rules (as in Spaziano and Harris) to be in a separate category from classes
of offenders and punishments (as in Stanford, Enmund, and Coker), with the consideration of
the former's constitutionality much less influenced by national consensuses than the
consideration of the cases in the latter group. In other words, the decisions in Spaziano and
Harris were not based on a simple tallying of states, but on an assessment of the procedure itself.
Because caning falls into the latter group, the tallying of states is still an important exercise, yet
one in which the Harris and Spaziano precedents should not be applied to destroy this aspect
of the "evolving standards" test.
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ii. Other Sources
The Supreme Court has held that the "evolving standards" of
society cannot be ascertained by looking only at legislative judgments:
"Legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth
Amendment standards since that Amendment was intended to safeguard
individuals from the abuse of legislative power."97 Thus, courts may bring
their own judgments to bear on the value of the punishment: "Although the
judgments of legislatures... weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of
the death penalty. "
This concept has prompted judges to utilize a wide variety of
sources when determining what constitutes the "evolving standards of
decency" of society. Some courts have relied on their own set of values
to strike down punishment that they deem to be cruel and unusual.9 9 In
Jackson v. Bishop,'° the Eighth Circuit relied on "broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency" in holding
that Arkansas prison guards' use of a leather whipping strap against
prisoners violated the Eighth Amendment.' Some courts have looked at
the prevailing standards throughout other environments, including other
prison systems"° and other countries." 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has also
held that international law informs the interpretation of the cruel and
7 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 n19; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313-14
(1972) (White, J., concurring).
' Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797).
"See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
100 404 F. 2d 571.
1o Id. at 579.
l°nSee Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,356 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting that "the current
sociological trend is toward the elimination of all corporal punishment in all correctional
institutions"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
"' Nipper, 81 S.E. at 165 ("Flogging has long since been abolished as a part of prison
discipline by all the great and enlightened nations of the world.").
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unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment.1 04
c. The "Excessiveness" Approach
The third approach courts have taken in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment is to bar punishment involving the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain and resulting in disproportionality between the offense
and the punishment."°5 This method supplements the "evolving standards"
test.106
i. The Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain
This component of the "excessiveness" test requires a sanction to
serve a legitimate penal aim: "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without pedological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction
of suffering." '107 The idea behind it is to decide whether "the lawmaking
power, in fixing the punishment, was sufficiently impelled by a purpose to
effect a reformation of the criminal." 10' 8 If the lawmakers were not
motivated by that purpose, then the punishment is unnecessary and
Wanton.
In analyzing the purposes of a sanction, it is useful to divide the
inquiry according to the four rationales for punishment: rehabilitation,
104 Trop, 356 U.S. at 102; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977);
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796-97 n.22; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31. But see Stanford, 492 U.S.
at 369 nl ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive...
.").(emphasis in original) The status of international law regarding caning will be discussed
infra, Section IV.
'o' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
"o6 See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
107 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 335-36. But see
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78 ("We also reject petitioners' argument that we should
invalidate capital punishment of 16- and 17-year old offenders on the ground that it fails
to serve the legitimate goals of penology ... socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even
purely scientific evidence is not an available weapon.") (This section of Justice Scalia's
opinion was not joined by a majority of the court.).
'08 Weems, 217 U.S. at 386-87 (White, J., dissenting).
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incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution."° The proponents of caning do
not claim that it serves a rehabilitative purpose, and substituting caning for
a prison sentence, as several bills proposed to do,"' actually defeats the
goal of incapacitation, as some dangerous criminals, still furious from their
caning humiliation,' may be put back on the streets. Therefore, the
punishment can only be justified as fulfilling the goals of deterrence and
retribution. Determining the retributive goal involves a highly subjective
"ethical judgment" by the court."2 It boils down to deciding whether or
not a convict is getting his "just desserts" for the crime he or she has
committed: "The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender.""' Since that test has only been applied in capital cases, and the
culpability of the offender is not relevant to the caning analysis," 4 the only
goal that can be debated according to objective evidence is the deterrence
rationale.
This focus is appropriate, since those who support caning cite
deterrence as its prime goal: "If we do a little caning early on in life and
'09 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 477-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Pugh v. Locie,
406 F.Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978) (stating that punishments are unconstitutional when they "militate against reform
and rehabilitation" or "increase the likelihood of future confinement.").
10 See, e.g., Mississippi House Bill 904, introduced in 1996: "It shall be considered
lawful for any judge, or any district attorney, at his discretion, to waive any or all of a sentence
of imprisonment ... and instead, impose a sentence including corporal punishment."
" See, e.g., Whipping, Caning, supra note 49, at Al 5 ("The guy whose flesh has
been ripped open, under the gaze of his fellow citizens, emerges from this treatment feeling a
trifle bitter, and instead of being penitent, is more apt to beat up the next person he sees.").
.. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481.
..3 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
14 The proponents of caning argue that it serves the retributive purpose well, at least
for violent criminals, because the most "just desserts" are those that reflect the offense: "For
crimes of violence, the offenders should suffer punishments of violence... A man who beats
up a little old lady surely deserves a thorough beating himself." GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND
PANFuL:ACASE FOR THE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS 35 (1995); see also Richard
Lacayo, The Real Hard Cell: Lawmakers Are Stripping Inmates of Their Perks, TIME, Sept. 4,
1995, at 31 (describing the "undeniable psychological satisfaction" in imposing physically harsh
punishments on convicts).
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get their attention, I don't think we will have to deal with them later in
life," said Alabama State Senator Charles Davidson." 5 Proponents of
caning bolster this argument by pointing to the stability and low crime rate
of the Singaporean society, which they attribute to its severe criminal
penalties, including caning: "A visit to the prosperous nation of Singapore
shows that its roadways are litter-free, its people are friendly and polite,
and its crime rate is incredibly low."' 16
However, an objective look at these arguments reveals their flaws.
First, there is no evidence that corporal punishment is a more effective
deterrent than current sanctions, "' only evidence that it harms the
individual and may lead to further misbehavior: "Study after study has
shown numerous problems stemming from 'corporal punishment' of
children by paddling or whipping: It is ineffective as a penalty, deterrent
or behavior modifier. It risks serious, lasting pain and physical and
.5 Editorial, Sanctioning Cruelty; Caning Proposal Sheer Stupidity, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1995, at 12A; see also Ann O-Ianlon, Bring back the Rod? America
Waves a Stick at Crime, INrERNATIONAL HERALD TRIu., Mar. 7, 1995 (quoting state legislators);
Editorial, Cane Prisoners on Public Square, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 27, 1995, at
18A.
11 Opinion, Look to Singapore's Example, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 26,
1995, at I IA; see also CNN News: School in Singapore Has Few Disciplinary Problems,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 20, 1994, Transcript #714-13; see also Hall, supra note 6, at 435.
17 The proponents of corporal punishment argue that, based on electric shock
studies of animals, physical pain has been shown to be a very effective deterrent:
"[C]orpoal punishment has been so successful that some animals have starved themselves
to death rather than eat the forbidden food [which is accompanied by a shock].., acute
pain is a very efficient and lasting suppressor of unwanted behavior." NEWMAN, supra
note 114, at 157. At the same time, Newman admits that the only two studies done of
deterrent effects of corporal punishment on humans (conducted in Delaware and in
England about fifty years ago) concluded that "the whipped group displayed a higher
recommittal rate than the unwhipped group." Id. at 162. He dismissed these studies as
being heavily biased against corporal punishment, since the British study began with the
conclusion that corporal punishment should be abolished, and in the Delaware study,
"those who were whipped were the more hardened criminals." Id. at 158-59. Newman
was probably correct in stating that these flawed studies were "not conclusive" on the
question of the deterrent effect of corporal punishment on humans, Id. at 160, but this
does not change the fact that no evidence exists to show that corporal punishment has a
greater deterrent effect on humans than any existing criminal sanction.
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psychological injury, plus rebelliousness, resentment, and behavior
problems. 1 18 Studies have shown that rather than being a deterrent,
corporal punishment actually results in higher rates of recidivism among
children than nonviolent punishments: "The facts revealed showed that of
all the boys birched, over 25 per cent were re-convicted within one month,
and over 76 per cent within two years. No other method had such a
startling record of failure.""' Corporal punishment has also been linked
to higher rates of violence among children: "States with high rates of
corporal punishment tend to have high rates of murder committed by
children and violence between students ... Children who are spanked are
three times more likely to seriously assault a sibling than those who
aren't." 2o Corporal punishment can be even more damaging when done
at an institution than when done by a family member:
Dr. Jerome Miller provided an interesting insight about
the effect upon a child of physical assault in institutions
compared with corporal punishment by parents: "A
family can even from time to time strike a youngster or
slap an adolescent, and hopefully it is done out of some
concern and some love. An institution cannot do that
without it being received as an impersonal hatred.
Institutions and bureaucracies don't love people."'
2 '
"" Editorial, Keep Violence Out of Sentencing and Nutcase Judges Off the Bench,
FORTLAUDERDALE SUN-SENT., Oct. 2, 1995, at 6A; See also Editorial, Corporal Stupidity, SAN
FRANcIscO CHRON., Jan. 11, 1996, at A22 ("violence begets violence"); Enrique Lavin, Anti-
Abuse Group BeratesPaddlingBill, Los ANGELES TiMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at 6 ("The only thing
it does is make an angry child angrier"); Sam Walker, Southern Schools Rethink Sparing the
Rod, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 21, 1995, at 1 ("paddling promotes violence").
"9 GEORGE RYLEY SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: A SURVEY OF
FLAGELLATION IN ITS HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS 189 (1942)
(quoting Cicely Craven, Honorary Secretary of the Howard League for Penal Reform in
London).
'20 Dana Wilkie, Corporal Punishment for General Good? Studies Rap the Practice,
SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRI., Aug. 22, 1994, at A3.
' State v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d 907, 910 (W.Va. App. 1978).
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For all of these reasons, courts have held that severe corporal punishment
of juveniles "frustrates correctional and rehabilitative goals."'22
The same holds true for adult prisoners: "Corporal punishment
generates hate toward the keepers who punish and toward the system
which permits it ... It frustrates correctional and rehabilitative goals...
Whipping creates other penological problems and makes adjustment to
society more difficult."" Early courts outlawing the whipping of convicts
also found that corporal punishment did not help to reform the prisoner:
"That which degrades and imbrutes a man cannot be either necessary or
reasonable."' 24 As with juvenile offenders, its deterrent effect on adults
has never been demonstrated: "In the case of the first offender not only
does caning, in nine cases out of ten, fail to prevent a repetition of the
offence, it nearly always succeeds effectually in ensuring such a
repetition."'25 Even some of the strongest supporters of caning question
its deterrent effect on adult prisoners. 26 There is no evidence showing that
severe corporal punishment improves behavior or reduces recidivism
among juvenile or adult offenders.
In addition, Singapore'27 may have a lower crime rate than the
U.S., but "the number and seriousness of crimes committed by juveniles
is rising dramatically," despite the harsh criminal penalties. 12 8 Also, no
connection has ever been established between the severe punishments and
122 Nelson, 491 F.2d at 356; supra note 74.
11 Jackson, 404 F.2d at 580; supra note 70.
12
4 Nipper, 81 S.E. at 167; supra note 56.
12 ScoTT,supra note 119, at 177.
... See Rhonda Cook, Around the South: Back to Hard Labor, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 20,1995, at 4D (quoting Alabama Prison Commissioner Ron Jones: "I don't think
it would work well on the adult offender.").
"A small number of other countries also allow caning, but Singapore is the country
that proponents of caning point to when arguing that caning serves as an effective deterrent. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text. A partial list of the other countries allowing severe
corporal punishments includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, the Bahamas, Antigua and
Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Swaziland,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Tom Kuntz, Beyond Singapore: Corporal Punishment, A
to Z, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 5, 1994, at 7A.
128 Singapore: Caning Shown on CD-ROM, U.P.I., Jan. 10, 1996.
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the low crime rate, which could be attributed to a host of other factors,
such as cultural attitudes towards nonconformity and misbehavior, the
equitable distribution of wealth, the homogeneity of the population, or
pervasive gun control. Other countries that have these same attributes,
such as Japan, maintain lower crime rates than Singapore without relying
on severe corporal punishment.129 Singaporean laws allow a host of other
measures that contribute to crime control, but that would be unthinkable
and unconstitutional in our country: "Singapore allows torture, arbitrary
arrest, detention and exile without charges, warrantless searches in some
cases and official restrictions of free speech and the media." 30 Also, the
1966 caning law that American legislators want to emulate was not passed
because of rising crime rates but "was passed largely to punish political
graffiti, most of which was scrawled by the left-wing minority party.
'131
There is no evidence that the Singaporean caning law has been an effective
deterrent to misconduct.
Because caning does not appear to serve any legitimate penal aim,
a court could conclude that it is merely the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" by following the same process that was used by the
Supreme Court in Thompson:
[W]e are not persuaded that the imposition of the death
penalty for offenses committed by persons under 16 years
of age has made, or can be expected to make, any
measurable contribution to the goals that capital
punishment is intended to achieve. It is, therefore,
'nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering,' Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. at 592, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 97 S. Ct. 2861, and thus an
unconstitutional punishment.
1 32
'" Wilkie, supra note 120, at A3.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (joint opinion of Stevens, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ.).
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ii. Cruel, Unusual, and Disproportionate
The disproportionality method, the second component of the
"excessiveness" approach, cannot be applied to caning unless it is known
precisely which offenses will warrant that punishment, because the test
involves comparing the relative severity of the offense and the punishment:
"A punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the
ban against 'cruel and unusual punishments."'" 33 The Supreme Court's
opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan'34 severely limited this type of challenge
in the noncapital context, allowing proportionality review only in cases of
"extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."'35
Because "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences [are] exceedingly rare,"'3 6 and because those that do succeed
usually involve a grossly disproportionate prison sentence'37 and not
grossly disproportionate corporal punishment, this type of challenge to a
caning statute is not likely to bear fruit.
However, once it is known which offenses will warrant the
punishment of caning, the three-factored test set out in Solem may be
applied to caning: "First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty."'38 Without other caning laws to compare it to,
this could be a highly subjective determination. 39 "Second,. . . compare
133 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 676; see aLso Williams v. Johnson, 845 F.2d 906, 909 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
134 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
135Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,288,303 (1983)). However,
the portion of Scalia's opinion arguing that the Eighth Amendment did not contemplate any
proportionality review was not joined by a majority of the court.
136 Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272
(1980)).
137 See, e.g., id.
13 Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
13' The proponents of corporal punishment argue that proportionality is actually less
of a problem with corporal punishment than with prison, since everyone feels the same amounts
of pain, while people react to the punishment of prison differently: "[T]he amounts of pain
administered may better, and perhaps more easily, be adjusted to the injury and damage of the
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N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction."14 This
would require a comparison of the caning penalty to the penalties that are
now meted out for whatever offenses will become "cane-eligible" under
the new law. If the current penalties for these offenses are insignificant,
e.g., probation or community service, then caning may be deemed
disproportionate to the offense. "Third, . . . compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."'41 No
jurisdiction has passed a caning bill, so again, this would require a
comparison of the caning penalty to penalties that are now given in other
jurisdictions for the same offenses.
0
d. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Juveniles"
No modem court has allowed the whipping or caning of juvenile
offenders in custodial institutions.'43 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment does not apply to the corporal punishment of students in the
school setting and that only civil tort remedies are available to students
who suffer excessive beatings.' Therefore, to make a successful
argument that caning juveniles who are not in custodial institutions (those
caned pursuant to court order as punishment for a crime) is
unconstitutional depends on distinguishing it from corporal punishment in
the school setting.
The factors cited in Ingraham'45 which differentiated the
offense." NEWMAN, supra note 114, at 51. However, even if corporal punishment is more easily
proportioned to the offense than existing punishments, that fact would not help to set the base
level of pain needed to proportionately punish any particular offense.
140 Id.
141 Id.
42 See supra note 81, explaining that this section may also be relevant to adults
in institutional settings.
14' Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (1974); see also Morales v. Turman, 383
F.Supp. 53, 77 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Harper v. Wall, 85 F.Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949).
't Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,671 (1977).
143 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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punishment of convicts and the punishment of children in schools
consisted of certain safeguards that ensured that the punishment in school
would not be cruel and unusual: "[T]he child is not physically restrained
from leaving school... Even while at school, the child brings with him the
support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment."'146 In
finding that California's proposed paddling bill would be constitutional, the
California Attorney General compared the paddling of juveniles in a
courtroom to the paddling of students in schools:
On balance, we believe that a courtroom is more
analogous to a school than to a prison or juvenile
custodial institution . . . The paddling would be
administered under a judge's supervision by or in the
presence of the juvenile's parents. Various other persons
would be witnesses. The punishment would be inflicted
only on the single occasion. Arbitrary actions undertaken
in a custodial setting would not be possible. Indeed, the
courtroom setting for administration of the paddling
would afford certain protections not found even in a
school setting. 1
47
However, the Attorney General ignored the observation in Ingraham that
"these safeguards are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common
law,"148 namely, the civil and criminal liability that results from a teacher
using excessive force. The Court relied on the threat of that liability to
prevent punishment that would be excessive: "[T]here is no reason to
believe that the common-law constraints will not effectively remedy and
deter excesses such as those alleged in this case.' 49 Unlike an injured
student, a caned juvenile might not be able to sue the "caner" for using
1
4 6 Id. at 670.
14' 78 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 94-1002 (July 3, 1995).
"l Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
149 Id.
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excessive force, as it would be the caner's explicit duty to inflict force that
would be deemed excessive if administered by a police officer or a
teacher.15
Also, the paddlings administered under the California law would
be more analogous to the typical beating administered in a school: "No
serious or lasting injury would be expected from the paddling,"' 1 unlike
the canings that would be administered in Alabama and other Southern
states, which would cause extreme pain and permanent scarring.'52 The
California Attorney General may not have been so willing to approve the
measure's constitutionality had it called for the Singapore-style caning of
graffiti vandals. Although technically a court would not consider the
severity of a punishment once it found that the Eighth Amendment does
not apply at all in this setting (because it is analogous to a school, where
according to Ingraham, the Eighth Amendment does not apply), there
must be some consideration of the severity of punishment. Otherwise,
taking Ingraham to its logical extreme, teachers could impose the death
penalty against unruly students without that being ruled violative of the
Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the severity of caning is fundamental to its
unconstitutionality because simple paddling, which causes no permanent
injury and does not even break the skin, is not only allowed in schools but
may also be allowed in adult institutions (if the same safeguards applied).
However, following the logic of Ingraham, the only corrective for official
caning or torture in schools would be a civil tort remedy, not a complaint
that those practices violate the Eighth Amendment. Again, the key
difference from Ingraham here is that it would be the caner's explicit duty
to inflict force that would be deemed excessive if inflicted by a teacher, so
civil tort remedies may not be available."5 3
In addition, some experts contend that the Supreme Court's finding
that the safeguards would prevent abuse is wrong: "Students in American
schools in the last few years have been hit with straps, arrows, sticks,
... See discussion infra Part 1I.C.
... 78 Op. Cal. Atty Gen. No. 94-1002 (July 3, 1995).
152 Poovey, supra note 9, at 3B.
..3 See infra Part M.C.
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ropes, belts, fists. They have been thrown against walls, desks, concrete
pillars... And many of these cases have occurred in schools where so-
called safeguards were in place. 0
54
The caning of juvenile offenders is more analogous to a prison
setting than to the school setting, contrary to the California Attorney
General's opinion, because juvenile convicts are treated like adult convicts,
not like misbehaving students. They go through a formal court proceeding
and are given a punishment by a judge, not an arbitrary, on-the-spot
beating administered by a teacher to maintain classroom order and
discipline. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment applies only to criminal punishments,155 and juvenile
adjudications are not technically criminal proceedings, the Court has left
the door open for the argument that juveniles should get Eighth
Amendment protection: "Some punishments, though not labeled 'criminal'
by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the
circumstances in which they are administered, thereby justifying
application of the Eighth Amendment." 56 Although juvenile proceedings
are usually non-adversarial and the judge is given broad discretion to
decide the case in the best interests of the child,'57 the Supreme Court has
held that at least the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to juvenile
proceedings.'58 Because the Eighth Amendment is just as critical as the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments are to protecting the rights of people brought
before a court of law, the judiciary should be willing to apply the Eighth
Amendment to juvenile proceedings.1
59
lnterview with Irwin HymanAllow Spanking in Schools?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., June 2, 1980, at 65.
.5.Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666-67.
" Id. at 669 n.37.
157 See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code section 202 (Deering Supp. 1994).
38 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,27-31 (1967).
19 For those juveniles who are not convicted of a crime in the juvenile or criminal
courts and are merely detained in a juvenile custodial institution for status and minor offenses,
their liberty interest is entitled to even more protection. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179
(1st Cir. 1983). The state would thus not be able to use caning as punishment for these
detainees, but only as would be necessary to maintain order and discipline. Id.; See also Jones
v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (no punishment is allowed without a criminal conviction).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
It can also be argued that such a brutal beating of minors would
constitute child abuse if administered by a parent and therefore should be
enjoined if done by the state:
Let us suppose they were methods of discipline imposed
upon a child by its father: would not this court sustain
removal of this child from such a brutal environment?..
[W]e cannot tolerate inhuman treatment by the state that
we would not tolerate if practiced upon its victim by his
or her own family. 6'
Under Alabama law, for example, responsible persons can be convicted
for child abuse if they "torture, willfully abuse, cruelly beat or otherwise
willfully maltreat any child under the age of 18 years," and offenders shall
"be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year
nor more than 10 years."'6  A showing of physical injury is not required.162
If hitting a child with a belt constitutes child abuse,'63 surely beating a child
with a razor-sharp rattan cane that splits the skin on impact and leaves
permanent scars would also violate the law if done by a parent or
responsible person. Therefore, pursuant to the Werner court's analysis, it
should also violate the law if done by a state actor."6
B. Equal Protection Challenges
Studies have shown that "minority students and poor white
children receive corporal punishment four to five times more frequently
The Eighth Amendment might not apply to those juveniles, but the Fourteenth Amendment
would. See infra Part II.C.
160 Werner, 242 S.E.2d at 910.
161 ALA. CODE § 26-15-3 (1995).
162 Updyke v. State, 501 So.2d 566, 568 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
163 Id. at 567.
16 On the other hand, many things that are criminal become legal at the hands of a
state actor, e.g., homicide is a crime unless done by a state-sponsored executioner.
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than middle- and upper-class white children."165 The same was shown to
be true for the whipping of convicts early in the century: "[I]t has lingered
here, probably, owing to the fact that an unusually large part of our
criminal population are colored."'" However, courts are generally not
receptive to such "racial disparity" arguments and would probably leave
such a determination to the legislature.'67 Even if such an argument
succeeded, it would probably not be recognized by a court until the
canings had been administered and the disparity was shown to exist in this
specific context. Therefore, the discussion of equal protection challenges
to caning must be left for another day.
C. Substantive Due Process Challenges
Because a court may decide that the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to juveniles in various settings (or to adults in those settings, for that
matter), the Fourteenth Amendment must also be used to challenge a
caning statute: "The eighth amendment applies to 'convicted prisoners'..
. By contrast, the more protective fourteenth amendment standard applies
to conditions of confinement when detainees, whether or not juveniles,
have not been convicted. ,1
68
The Supreme Court has recognized that any intrusion into the
body that is "needlessly severe" violates the substantive due process
element of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 "Needless severity" is shown
when a punishment inflicts pain, causes anxiety of imminent medical
danger, causes permanent injury, or leads to health risks. 7 ° The standard
for substantive due process violations consists of condemning state action
that "shocks the conscience.""' This test has been applied by courts in the
165 Editorial, Corporal Stupidity, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Jan. 11, 1996, at A22.
'"Nipper, 81 S.E. at 166.
'
67 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
16 Gary v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
169 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITuTnONAL LAW § 15-9, at 1332 (2d ed. 1988).
o TRIBE, supra note 169, at § 15-9 at 1333.
'71Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
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context of school children who suffered excessive corporal punishment at
the hands of teachers or school officials.'7 2 In the leading case on the
issue, the Fourth Circuit established the test for these types of actions:
[T]he substantive due process inquiry in school corporal
punishment cases must be whether the force applied
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the
need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism
rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that
it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience.'73
Several courts have combined this test with the harsh physical
punishments described in lngraham to set a constitutional minimum below
which corporal punishment does not give rise to a substantive due process
claim. 74 If the punishment is so excessive that it rises above this standard,
then it violates substantive due process, thereby subjecting the punishing
teacher to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 However, the standard
requires punishment that is extremely severe, for example, that which
would cause permanent scarring or extreme pain.'76
Although caning would probably meet that high standard by virtue
of its brutality and the permanent scars that it usually leaves, a more
difficult problem concerns whether or not "caners" or other state actors
could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating substantive due
process. Unlike a teacher who has excessively beaten a student to the
172 See, e.g., Thrasher v. General Casualty Co., 732 F.Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. Wis.
1990), Garcia v. Micra, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
174 See, e.g., Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655-56.
171 Hall, 621 F.2d at 611.
176See, e.g., Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653 (girl received permanent scars from being struck
with split paddle); see generally Jerry Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal
Punishment in Public Schools: Jurisprudence That Is Literally Shocking to the Conscience,
31 S.D. L. REv. 276,287-94 (1994).
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point where permanent scars result, or a policeman who has excessively
brutalized an arrestee, a "caner" would have the explicit statutory duty to
inflict such a punishment. Therefore, suing a "caner" under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 would require one to tackle thorny issues of qualified immunity (that
are beyond the scope of this article). But perhaps state actors may still be
enjoined from caning, given the fact that brutal punishment results from
a caning statute and is thus still an "inhumane abuse of official power
literally shocking to the conscience,""1 regardless of who is abusing that
power. The only difference is that the excessive punishment of caning
would be authorized by the state legislature, which doesn't make it any
more justifiable under the Fourteenth Amendment (which forbids this type
of brutalization). Although the substantive due process argument has
typically been used against brutalizing state actors who have overstepped
their bounds of authority, such as overzealous police officers (as in
Rochin), it is the type of standard that is designed to be expanded to
include new abuses of power such as this: "[I]t [is] a last line of defense
against those literally outrageous abuses of official power whose very
variety makes formulation of a more precise standard impossible." '178
Therefore, it should be applied by courts to bar caning in situations where
Eighth Amendment protections do not apply.
IV. CANING VIOLATES LNTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted previously, international law informs the interpretation
of the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment.'79 Also,
international law, as part of federal common law, is binding on the states
and state courts. 8 ° Therefore, if caning can be shown to violate
177 Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
178 Id.
179 See supra note 104 and accompanying text
's RESTATEMENT (THRRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, See.
111 comment d (1987) ("international law.., is cognizable in cases in State courts, in the same
way as United States law"); ThePaquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("international law
is part of our law").
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international law, it not only lends credence to the notion that it is cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, but it might also violate federal
common law, which is binding on the states.' 8'
The U.S. violates international law when it fails to uphold its treaty
obligations or when it violates a norm of customary international law." 2
Two standards must be met for a rule to become a norm of customary
international law: it must have been generally adopted by the international
community, and it must be reinforced by opinio juris, that is, "evidence
that the norm has gained the status of giving rise to a binding international
legal obligation, rather than just being a matter of domestic legal policy."' 83
U.S. courts have looked to treaties, national laws, "the usage of nations,
judicial opinions, and the works of jurists" in deciding whether or not a
rule or practice has become a binding norm of customary international
law. 184
Besides binding their signatories in their own right, treaties are
also one of the most authoritative sources to be considered in determining
whether a norm of customary international law exists.'85 Although the
U.S. is a signatory to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and caning would
appear to be prohibited by its definition of torture ("any act by which
'
8 1
RESTATENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec.
111 comment d (1987) ("customary international law ... [is] also federal law and as such [is]
supreme over state law").
1" RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec.
111 (3) (1987) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and
to international agreements of the United States .... ).
"' Lisa Arnett, Death at an Early Age: International Law Arguments Against the
Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 245,257-58 (1988).
'm Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1980). The Filartiga court
found, after a review of these sources, that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of
nations." Id. at 884. However, no court, domestic or international, has held specifically that
caning constitutes torture.
1s RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
Introductory Note (1987) ("In our day, treaties have become the principal vehicle for making law
for the international system, more and more of established customary law is being codified
by general agreements.").
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severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted"), the definition
excludes "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions." '186 This exclusion would appear to make any physical
punishment legal by the treaty, no matter how brutal, as long as it is
legalized by the state. The United States Senate, in giving its advice and
consent to ratification of the treaty, repudiated that notion:
[W]ith reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the
United States understands that 'sanctions' includes
judicially-imposed sanctions and other enforcement
actions authorized by United States law or by judicial
interpretation of such law. Nonetheless, the United States
understands that a State Party could not through its
domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the
Convention to prohibit torture.8 7
Therefore, a signatory to the treaty may not avoid its obligations by
legalizing torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. Several
courts have held that caning constitutes punishment that would be
prohibited by the treaty (though not specifically constituting "torture").
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has held that
"birching" (similar to caning) constituted "degrading punishment" under
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which prohibits degrading punishment, just as the
Convention Against Torture does (Article 16)."'8 Also, the Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe relied on the International Bill of Human Rights, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, and the Inter-American Convention on Human
1 6Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
7 136 CoNG. REc. S17,486, 17,491-17,492 (Oct. 27, 1990).
" Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982). But cf. Campbell and
Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982) (corporal punishment in schools
not inhuman or degrading punishment).
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Rights, as well as cases from the European Court of Human Rights
(including Tyrer), to support its holding that whipping violated the
provision in the Zimbabwe Constitution prohibiting "inhuman or
degrading punishment."1"9 These cases show the development of an
international legal norm interpreting caning as "degrading punishment"
that could be binding on signatories to the Convention Against Torture.
The norm may also be binding on all countries if it reaches the
level of customary international law and is not objected to consistently
from its inception by those countries. Although "a norm does not have to
be universally accepted in order to qualify as customary international
law,""19 national law and practice offer mixed evidence as to whether a
norm of customary international law exists barring caning as inhuman or
degrading. Although the majority of countries do not allow caning,
whipping, or flogging, a significant minority continue to administer these
punishments, "especially ones professing to adhere to Islamic law, or
Sharia."'191 A partial list of the countries allowing severe corporal
punishments includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, the Bahamas,
Antigua and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and of
course, Singapore. 92
Although no jurisdiction in the U.S. allows caning -- and the U.S.
government contended that Michael Fay's caning violated Article Five of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (prohibiting torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) 193 -- nearly half of the
states in the U.S. allow the corporal punishment of schoolchildren. 194
"8 See Keith Highet and George Kahale Il, Zimbabwe--Human Rights--Inhuman or
DegradingPunishment-Incorporation of International Law and Diplomacy, 84 A.J.I.L. 768,
769 (1990) (analyzing Juvenile v. State, Judgment No. 64/89, Crim. App. No. 156/88, Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe (1989)).
'90Arnett, supra note 183, at 256.





'"See Public Likes Proposed Public-Beating Laws, Experts Do Not, supra note 21,
at 5A.
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Therefore, although the evidence as to national practice is not
determinative, it could be argued that the fact that only about sixteen
countries still allow flogging shows that it is condemned by the majority
of countries, thereby making it violative of a norm of customary
international law.15
However, the U.S. Senate entered a reservation to the definition
of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" when it gave
advice and consent to the Convention Against Torture to ensure that it
could not be bound by international law that was more stringent than the
Constitution:
[T]he United States considers itself bound by the
obligation under Article 16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,' only insofar as the
term 'cruel,inhuman or degrading punishment' means the
cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.1
96
This reservation, if consistently asserted by the U.S., might even shield
American caning laws if the norm that caning constitutes cruel, inhuman,
or degrading punishment becomes customary international law (which
binds all nations, whether or not they are parties to the Convention Against
Torture, unless they have been consistent objectors to the norm from its
inception).
Nevertheless, the aforementioned cases and the norm of
customary international law barring caning (if it exists) are still evidence
of present-day international societal mores, which a court should use to
inform the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's "evolving standards
"'See Joan Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 669 n.50
(1983) (extensively discussing how many nations must conform to a rule to transform it into a
norm of customary international law).
196 136 CONG. REc. S17,486, 17,491-17,492 (Oct. 27, 1990).
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of decency.""9
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that a combination of constitutional arguments will
probably frustrate efforts to cane children and adults in a variety of
settings. As of this writing, no state has been able to pass a caning bill, but
proposals continue to resurface.'98 What is the likely fate of these
proposals, and what do they mean for the future of corporal punishment
in America? Are we regressing to the time of the pillory, the rack, and the
cat-o'-nine-tails, or is this a short-term trend that will soon disappear
forever?
As long as people believe that cruelty can ever be a solution to any
predicament, corporal punishment will loom as a possibility on the shelves
of our national consciousness, to be dusted off and reinstated every other
generation or so. However, unless and until caning becomes widely
accepted in American society, the Constitution should ensure that no one
will suffer that indignity in the United States.
197 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
198 See supra Part I and accompanying text.
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